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Once, many, many years ago, I heard an exasperated philosopher in a seminar in London say, “I know
what Wittgenstein said was wrong, but surely not everything he said was wrong!” This thought, among
many others, occurred to me while reading Thinking How To Live, Alan Gibbard’s intelligent, wide
ranging, unpretentious, but in the end, rather disappointing work. In making this last claim, I do not want
to suggest Gibbard’s work is particularly unusual in this respect. Gibbard’s argument disappoints me in
the way that a great deal of contemporary meta-ethics does, (particularly it must be admitted, the
arguments of so called expressivists). The reader I am sure has been there before (this is certainly so if
the reader has been reading Simon Blackburn or Frank Jackson for example). A picture is rehearsed with
undeniable skill and sophistication, the Frege-Geach problem is invariably trotted out one more time and
“solved,” but the hard questions, the interesting questions, that an account like this generates, tend to get
answered with soothing phrases rather than taken up with good arguments. This is particularly so for the
issue of how an expressivist understands justification in moral life.
But to say this is to get a bit ahead of myself, to point out what I think is the fundamental gap in
the overall presentation, an issue to which I will return. What lies behind this opening recollection;
why begin with this invocation of the later Wittgenstein? The answer has to do with the way in
which we appear to live in a philosophical climate at once highly attuned to important differences
within a general philosophical category and remarkably indifferent to those differences. When
Wittgenstein offered the idea of “family resemblances” as an antidote to essentialism, for those in
philosophical aesthetics or philosophy of religion, for example, the idea was a godsend, a model
that enabled philosophers to bypass the sterile, fruitless task of offering generalizations about “the
nature of art” or “the nature of religion” and instead turn to distinctive subgroups where plausible
generalizations might hold all the same. Instead of the nature of art, Arthur Danto wrote
interestingly on the nature of contemporary painting for example. And in moral theory, it is as if
this point was achieved in the philosophical culture simply through the work that was done in such
subgroups. The past fifty years or so has seen the emergence of constructivist political theory that
takes up only the basic structure of society, a revived interest in what may count as virtuous
character without discredited metaphysics, and in applied ethics, discussions of obligations to others
in other nations or obligations to animals. The idea that the justification story offered in any one of
these domains would simply instantiate some general justification story operating everywhere, the
idea that in each case we are worried about how to bring about some single thing, “moral
goodness,” has been left behind as implausible. Here, one might say, the later Wittgenstein just had
to be right. And as I say, the philosophical culture seems to understand this very well. Rawls and
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/rossstrev.html[9/18/2009 5:09:36 PM]
Singer (to take but two more well known examples) make it very clear they do not think the
considerations that constitute “the just” or “the obligatory” in the domains they take up are
instantiations of some more general evaluative concept (let alone property) that lives everywhere in
our normative life. The anti-essentialist point has been absorbed and the quality of the philosophical
work that has been generated over the past fifty years is ample testament to the fertility of this
threshold insight.
But when one turns to meta-ethics, a rarely commented upon Alice in Wonderland quality dreamily
emerges as philosophers earnestly wonder about “the meaning” of this thing “good,” and Moore,
here and here alone, is discussed endlessly (and I mean endlessly). It is hardly surprising that, if you
do think there is something interesting to be said about “the good,” (or, more pointedly, if you feel
that there must be something interesting of a general nature to be said here and it is just a question
of choosing the best from a fixed set of available philosophical candidates), then that something will
turn out to be very abstract, almost bloodless. After all, consider what an analysis of “the divine”
would look like if it had to apply to everything that calls itself a religion, or what a description of
“art” would be if had to be consistent with every slide shown in every introduction to art class. It is
equally unsurprising that, if one is driven by this ambition, many philosophers will find the
expressivist strategy of identifying “good” with (roughly) the expression of a certain sort of attitude
towards courses of action a natural winner. After all, no natural property, however wildly
disjunctive, gives us the truth conditions for all instances of evaluative attribution. As no one will
now ever forget, since it always makes sense to ask, any answer that names a property cannot be
right. And besides, no property talk could ever capture the active or practical nature of evaluative
life. Thus the expressivist view: “good” names no property but a way of taking things, a plan in life,
a decision, a verdict that some state of affairs is, for some agent, given his plan, “okay to do”
(Gibbard’s term).
A few things need to be stressed before going further. In one important respect, Gibbard’s project
goes back to Hume, in that it attempts to figure out a place for moral life within a fundamentally
naturalistic outlook. How, one might ask, do moral properties, (or, to use Hume’s term, “moral
distinctions”) “fit” into our world, a world explained by reference to physical stuff, law and
causation? At the same time, like Hume, Gibbard rightly rejects any “error theory” or attempt to
explain moral life away. We need an account that makes sense of this fundamental feature of
ourselves – no error theory is (again, quite rightly) taken seriously for a moment. The success of
Hume’s own secondary property / projectivist treatment of morality with respect to these ambitions
was mixed – by tying moral qualities to inner reactions, he did make sense of how morality is
possible within a fundamentally naturalistic account, and he made sense (he thought) of how moral
qualities could be important to us and motivate us. But an account like Hume’s leaves it unclear
how we can think of persons in genuine opposition to one another (as opposed to merely different
from one another), and how any state of affairs in the world (as opposed to some state inside the
person) can really be said to bear a moral property. These undeniable features of moral life seem
unsatisfactorily accounted for when within secondary property projectivism, and an expressivist
view like Gibbard’s seeks to remedy these deficiencies without abandoning the fundamental
projectivist insight.
Gibbard’s expressivism differs from the Humean model in several ways. In Gibbard’s argument, the
essence of the normative is found in the closely related ideas of norm and plan. We deliberate and
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accept various norms, and it is in virtue of those norms that facts in the world, or courses of action,
have the normative valence that they do. In deciding what to do, in fixing upon a plan, we identify
what we take to be good. As Gibbard puts it many times, “In deciding what to do, we decide what
we ought to do.” “Questions of what we ought to do are questions of what to do.” (10, 19, 181) In
theory, we could try to imagine every conceivable contingency, in every possible world, and then
go on to determine what we would do in that contingency – this fully specified set of decisions
Gibbard calls a “hyper-plan,” and a person with a hyper-plan would then be said to have a complete
system of value. What we would do (upon reflection) and what we take to be good are simply
identical – hence “expressivism.” The term “good” does not denote some property or fact in the
world; rather its use on any occasion expresses a posture of endorsement or approval towards such
facts. “[These] states of mind are explained not as beliefs with such and such content, but in some
other way. They are explained psychologically as sentiments or attitudes, perhaps, or as universal
preferences, states of norm acceptance – or states of planning.” (181)
So, does Gibbard’s expressivism improve upon Hume? Yes it does, in certain ways. In the first
place, states of affairs (not merely inner states) now bear evaluative properties, or descriptions,
though they do so only relative to a norm or a plan. “There is no such thing as a specifically
normative state of affairs; all states of affairs are natural. We do though have normative thoughts
and they are distinct from naturalistic thoughts.” (181) Torturing children really is wrong – relative
to the norm you have presumably accepted that torturing children is wrong. "The world, as Gibbard
puts it in more than one place, is filled with “plan-laden facts” – given, that is, a person has a plan
and this plan determines what is “okay to do.” Second, because particular courses of action really
do rule out rival courses of action, we can speak of one plan or norm opposing or contradicting
another. We are expressivists in the sense that there is no fact the use of the term “goodness” picks
out – for a person to find some state of affairs good is for that person to express a preference, or
more elaborately, a preference for a plan in which that course of action is endorsed. But given that
this is what goodness is, it is then, for persons, an undeniable fact that certain states of affairs in
the world bear normative content. Given a norm, a plan, (or even better, a hyper-plan), goodness
then supervenes abundantly on an otherwise value-less world. Thus we get a kind of realism
(Gibbard follows Blackburn in calling his view “quasi-realism” – I would prefer “faux realism”), in
that when all is in place, we will have a grammar of attribution, contradiction, reason giving and so
forth – but without anything so silly as moral facts, without anything like what Mackie made up
and then quite understandably professed to find so queer.
There is much in this book to be admired and praised. The discussion of naturalist realism and its
limitations is excellent. The elaboration of the distinction between properties and concepts makes it
easy to be both a naturalist and non-reductive about the normative. The way in which Gibbard
explains what he means by plan or reason is a model of patience. But, to get to the heart of things,
one cannot help but feel reading Gibbard that “everything old is new again,” and in two ways. First
is the point made earlier: the whole project of offering a general account of “good” and the
candidate put forward for a successful version of this, that goodness is essentially finding something
“okay to do,” smacks of the mind numbing 1950s. I mean, really. When we are positively drowning
in context sensitive discussions of distributive justice, personal virtue, obligation and the like, how
can anyone really expect us not to feel the jolt of strangeness in offering “okay to do” as the
fundamental touchstone of moral judgment? This sort of analysis just makes it easy for the French
to lampoon us. More fundamentally, unless I am missing something, we have in Gibbard’s
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argument really simply a re-issue of the view of R.M. Hare, but, sadly, without Hare’s willingness
to acknowledge (grudgingly, it is true, but acknowledged nevertheless) what a view like this
commits you to on the crucial issue of justification.
Hare, like Gibbard, sought a general, overarching account of “good” that would accommodate what
was taken to be the undeniable insight behind Moore’s open question test – that no natural property
could give us what goodness means – while moving beyond what was already seen as the deeply
implausible ontology of intuitionism. Hare also succinctly criticized naturalism along lines more or
less identical to those found in Gibbard. Hare argued that we could not take good to mean “has
descriptive properties D1, D2, D3…” for then it would be impossible to commend those properties.
If naturalism were correct, then in saying “D1 – D3 is good,” we would simply be repeating
ourselves, and that cannot be right. When Gibbard argues that even if we knew every fact, or had
on hand a full description of the world, we would still find it reasonable to debate about what we
ought to do, he is making virtually the identical point. (14) And so, (returning to Hare),
“goodness,” Hare thought, rejecting descriptivism, but determined to find a general account of the
concept, cannot be a property but must be found essentially in an activity, in commending. (Sound
familiar?) In moral life, there is in Hare this further wrinkle: we are said to commend sincerely only
if we do so by reference to a principle in universal form (what Gibbard would call a norm), and one
we would accept were we ourselves to occupy any of the relevant place holders the principle speaks
of. (For Gibbard, the same result is approached via the possible-worlds device – we imagine the
agent endorsing the norm or plan with the implications fully specified in all possible worlds – the
hyper-plan.) Hare speaks of principles that we accept prescriptively, Gibbard speaks of norms we
understand fully when we think through the decisions they would entail in every possible world.
Both reject a descriptivist or naturalist analysis of the concept for identical, and identically sound,
reasons – one might say, for both, the descriptivist or naturalist cannot capture evaluation in so far
as it is a form of life. The activity of commending or thinking what to do will resist capture in any
descriptivist reduction. And the differences between these two would appear to be marginal too. In
both cases, you will have a world that bears normative properties, but not in itself; only once the
norm has been endorsed. Moral properties will indeed straightforwardly supervene upon natural
ones, but only because people choose the norms that make it so. Evaluative attributions, to use
Gibbard’s term, are “plan-laden.” In both cases (though this was not Hare’s worry, it is available to
one who holds his view), there is a robust realism about moral life, but moral life is fit into the
natural world without presuming any strange entities, which is to say, neither natural nor non-
natural “moral facts.” In both cases, by understanding moral life in terms of agent centered plans or
norms, this anti-naturalism towards the moral will not prevent you from making sense of
contradiction and opposition in moral life too.
And in both cases there is a big problem with how we are to understand justification. With Hare,
the problem is striking and unavoidable. Because judgment is always relative to a principle, and
because principles cannot be said to describe or mirror any moral facts, should we have
fundamental conflict among principles, we cannot adjudicate such conflict or say one or the other
side to that conflict is really or objectively wrong or right. Justification is relative to a principle but
ultimate principles cannot themselves be justified – they are chosen and lived out sincerely, but
beyond that, there is no criterion of assessment open to one who follows Hare. As I say, to his
enduring credit, Hare faced out this consequence of his view in the chapter “Toleration and
Fanaticism” in his later work, Freedom and Reason. If the Nazi really and truly sincerely accepted
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the consequences of his view, even should he or she occupy one of the, shall we say, “less favored”
places, then there is nothing further the liberal can say. Of course, we are right, by our lights, to
oppose and resist the Nazi with all our might. And we can say that relative to our principles, the
Nazi is bad, bad, bad. But we cannot say, our theory cannot make sense of saying, there is some
fact or consideration the Nazi gets wrong. Ontologically, from the standpoint of meta-ethics,
(however you want to put the point) the two justifications are simply on a par. Hare thought this
conclusion, unhappy as it was, was simply what followed from “the nature of morals” and so just
had to be swallowed. There was a bracing existentialist willingness to look the void in the face in
those days. Nowadays, expressivists never take up this sort of example, and certainly never admit in
such bald terms that their view cannot avoid this consequence. Yet the consequence is equally
unavoidable and equally embarrassing. On the whole, in my experience, contemporary expressivists
just prefer to change the subject to something that appears to resemble the justification problem. So
consider Gibbard’s to me rather disingenuous discussion of skepticism in ethics:
This accusation of skepticism we can dismiss. Suppose, as I maintain, that ethical
statements concern what to do. What then constitutes ethical skepticism? It must be the
view that there is nothing to do – not just that the alternatives are always bleak and
boring, but that nothing is ever the thing to do, given what choices we have. All answers
to questions of what to do are mistaken, a skeptic must say to count as a skeptic. (14)
In a sense, this highly artificial characterization of “skepticism in ethics” is entirely natural. In the
domain of meta-ethics, the tendency to compare our epistemic and metaphysical concepts as they
play out in the naturalist context with the alleged “counterpart” concepts in the moral one can
become something like a parlor game that has gone out of control. As I think has been pretty clear
since Plato’s Republic, “skepticism in ethics” is not given in the thought that “there is nothing to
do”; rather it is given in the thought that our justifications in fact cannot deliver the objectivity or
authority they purport to have. Rather than look at moral life and just describe what skepticism there
is, Gibbard takes skepticism as it is understood since Descartes, plugs in moral notions and voila, it
turns out that there is nothing to worry about after all! It goes without saying that the authority
problem, with us in moral life, not merely in moral philosophy, as soon as anyone (in this case,
Thrasymachus) bothers to offer a subversive interpretation of our central moral concepts, goes
completely unaddressed.
An analogous point can be made with respect to his discussion of normative kinds, and how the use
of different normative concepts across different cultures is to be characterized. (Chapter 8) This is
in fact an excellent discussion, one of the high points of the book; I choose it because here we see
the problem of justification evaded rather than mischaracterized; here what we see is simply the
disinclination to take up the next natural issue in the argument. One cannot tell if Gibbard thinks
that there is a solution to the authority problem consistent with his expressivist views, or if, like
Hare, he thinks that the truth of expressivism means that a certain stoical realism about our inability
to get anything like real objectivity here must just be faced out and accepted. And generally, I feel
when reading expressivists like Gibbard and Blackburn, they are themselves not sure what they
think on this issue and just prefer to change the subject. But let me now turn to the discussion of
normative kinds and connect it with my earlier claim regarding the objectivity problem.
Normative kinds will be terms that both pick out bits of the world (usually behavior and intentions)
and do so with evaluative criteria. So to call an act “malicious” or “brutal” is to say not simply that
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some violence was done, but that it was undeserved, unwarranted. When a surgeon amputates or a
soldier kills in self defense, this is not generally termed “malicious.” When a jury debates about
whether to find the beating “malicious,” that a certain amount of physical damage was done is
already conceded and not at issue; the jury must determine whether the action was in every way
unjustified. Now let us take our term “brutal” and suppose (Gibbard’s example) a culture of the
Bulli that has a term “wumpura.” The Bulli use this term before many of the same actions we term
brutal, and so on the surface of things, the two terms can appear roughly co-extensive. But it turns
out that for the Bulli, such actions are to be praised, they show (they think) who is boss, and they
get the weaker party to fear you. Gibbard is quite right to say that with these understandings in the
background, we could never then translate “brutal” as “wumpura,” since the implication of being
undeserved and so wrongful is not preserved in their normative kind. Gibbard suggests (and I think
he is right) that should they disagree as to whether an act is “wumpura” or not, we cannot enter into
this dispute, we cannot understand it. (When Wittgenstein said, “If a lion could talk, we would not
understand him” he meant exactly this point.) Since for us, no act is really “wumpura,” only brutal
or not-brutal, a very different matter, we must simply demur, and regard what they say as “neither
true nor false.” (169)
Gibbard is quite right to resist the crude reductionism that certain versions of moral naturalism
might be committed to here – our moral concepts have irreducibly normative components woven
into them, and should these differ, then no amount of shared reference will give us equivalence
(how far we are from “gavagai” now). But it is only natural to ask: well, can we ever say that some
normative kinds (or more precisely, the judgments they support) are simply right, not simply not-
identical with their imagined rivals, and the judgments supported by their rivals wrong? Of course,
this is a thought that would have to be made good without any talk of anything so spooky as stand
alone “moral facts,” but it turns out that this is not so wild an idea as expressivists might have us
believe. So consider the idea that this person is wrongly enslaved because no one, on the basis of
color or race, deserves to be enslaved. Crazy, huh? Let us imagine the counterpart culture that has
the counterpart normative kinds that supports the counterpart judgment. Fine. The natural question
now is: is there any non-controversial description of the person that requires ruling out one of these
judgments and endorsing the other? Kant certainly thought so, and I think so did Mill. (Figures we
rarely read about in meta-ethics, funnily enough.) If you think that we simply must see persons as
more or less equally rational and more or less equally free, (in the sense of merely being
deliberative), then slavery would seem to be wrong. If you think that all creatures, let alone
persons, have a prima facie claim to freedom from suffering and death, as utilitarians do, then
failure to save the child drowning in the wading pool is wrong. Notice there is no talk of moral
facts here – so far as I know, Kant and Mill, our pre-eminent objectivists, never talk this way. What
they do talk about is the person, and what certain descriptions of the person, once granted, would
seem to require when we think about morality. Gibbard never considers this line of argument – we
simply do not know whether he thinks it must be thought of as but one more norm that is equally
embraceable or resistible, one more plan or hyper-plan an agent might or might not have after
deciding what to do, or whether the Kantian can make good on the claim that it is not, consistent
with moral thought, resistible after all. And if there is any objectivity in moral thought, it is here. It
is not in the oft-repeated, bland assurances of “quasi-realism” that the “grammar” of expressivism
“mimics” the grammar of “realism.” (19, 112, 126, 181) Nietzsche and Marx would snort with
derision to hear that claim! The “justifying grammar” of libertarian capitalism “mimics” that of
realism too – so what? Does the fact that talk of God and the divine mimics talk of clouds or tress
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(and it really does) in any way show that all this God-talk we hear is justified? To the critic, or to
the skeptic, (again, consider Marx, Thrasymachus) it is precisely this surface resemblance relation
that is so annoying.
The question has to be, how good are the justifications? And that, in turn, has to be the question: do
justifications ever hook onto certain descriptions of persons we cannot deny, with implications that
that cannot admit of any plausible rival? I sometimes think so, in some contexts at least. But why I
think this and whether I am right (which is to say, whether Kant or Mill were right) is not the issue.
What is at issue is this: just what exactly is the expressivist position on this strategy? Talk about
our commitment to the constraints of naturalism, deflationary conceptions of truth, supervenience
and constitution, the Frege-Geach problem – all of this can only go so far. Moral judgments claim
to be justified. Some theorists have claimed they are objectively so – not because of anything so
silly as moral facts, but because of what persons are. What does the expressivist think of that
claim? Of course, I do not deny that expressivists can draw upon Darwinian-naturalist explanations
for why most of us act in certain ways, why cooperation is generally valued, or why certain moral
judgments seem normal to us, and others seem monstrous. But I take it as obvious that this sort of
argument cannot really be said to address the challenge at hand. In the epistemic context, the
extreme demands of Cartesian skepticism can be set aside on pragmatic grounds as of largely
theoretical interest only. No one really needs to be persuaded they are not brains in a vat before
they will trust the evidence of their senses. And a Darwinian or naturalist explanation of this
proclivity can more or less satisfy us as to why it has the authority it does. But in the moral
context, troubling, substantive challenge to our everyday notions of the good (such as plantation
slavery, colonial conquest, sexual subordination) are as common as sand, sometimes even
historically dominant, and by no means so easily set aside with any bland appeal to what Darwin
might point to. One might imagine a naturalist explanation for why certain symphonies seem
harmonic to most us. Fine. But if there were subgroups whose ears appeared to be different and
heard other sorts of things as harmonic, we would then, in this example, be left with something like
a “whose to say?” relativism. Something like this is surely the case with the comic. No
“naturalistic” explanation of why we laugh generally can hope to generate any objectivity on the
divisive issue of whether Borat really is funny. (It is not.) Is moral difference, on the fundamental
level, like that? Well, not if Kant or Mill is right. But we do not know what Gibbard thinks about
that possibility, how well granting it fits with a consistent commitment to expressivism, or how at
ease he would be with the alternative.
Again, moral judgments claim to be justified. Some theorists have thought they might be
objectively so. Hare made it clear that sadly, this claim could not stand – not consistent with how
moral language was thought to work in his theory. As an expressivist who does not wish to cause
undue alarm on this issue, Gibbard sometime speaks in ways that would give comfort to the
objectivist intuition here – he speaks of some plans as being “crazy” or “mistaken” (150) – but at
the same time, because he really is an expressivist, the language of non-objectivity runs like a
continuous drum beat throughout his account. And fundamentally, it would seem undeniably, what
normative attributions there are there are because of plans, and plans themselves cannot be assessed
by anything but another plan. Gibbard writes: “Expressivism, I keep stressing, is not a substantive
theory of what’s right and wrong, what’s good and bad, and what makes it that way.” (185) Maybe.
But it certainly is a theory about what a “substantive theory” could be, or what the idea of a
“substantive theory” can possibly amount to. It may be right, but it would be nice if expressivists
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who believed in their account would face up to what being right entailed and then tried to figure out
how convincing that would be. It is an odd fact that while our current expressivist theories are
infinitely more sophisticated than their hoary ancestors of sixty years ago, they are far less
transparent, far less honest, and so to me, far less satisfying. It’s not okay.
Steven Ross
Hunter College & The Graduate Center/CUNY
